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vi ABSTRACT In the cooperative relaying communication, the system has to defend itself against the eavesdropper which may undermines the message integrity by sending the modified messages.
We propose a physical layer integrity check scheme for cooperative relaying communication,
where a source broadcast the signals to both destination target and an untrustworthy relay node.
The approach exploits physical layer signals in detecting the modified messages conducted by the relay. We develop a scheme that utilizes a few cryptography information in the initial message packets to estimate the optimal detecting threshold. By applying the optimal detecting method, the proposed approach achieves almost same performance provided by perfect cryptography strategy that can detect all the modified messages but with high computational cost caused by applying cryptographic encryption to all the transmitted messages.
Keywords-physical layer, integrity check; modified messages; cryptography; optimal detecting threshold.
1 CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW
Introduction
With rapidly developing of wireless networks and signal processing techniques, the cooperative relaying communication [1] has been widely applied to many scenarios such as distributed sensors and cooperative nodes group [2] [3] . It has gained considerable attention in the literatures as a promising next generation wireless network [4] .
Because of its inherent vulnerable nature, it is easy for eavesdropper to monitor the signals in the transmit path or intercept the messages. Thus substantial researches have been conducted to develop the techniques to guarantee the security requirement. And many physical layer approaches with lower computation cost and less protocol overhead [5] have been developed [6] . However, because of the highly development of cryptography algorithm, little attention has been paid to the integrity issues such as 'Man In the Middle attack' or malicious relay disruption [7] , especially less researches have been conducted to exploit the physical layer property to accomplish the integrity check. In general, the advanced cryptographic algorithm requires more computation resource, so it is hard to apply to wireless networks where the destination nodes are resource constrained [8] . In this Thesis, instead of achieving security by merely transmitting highly encrypted messages [9] which consume a lot computational resource, we proposed a scheme that exploits the physical layer signals in detecting messages modification conducted by relay. Our results shows by applying optimal detecting threshold method, the proposed approach can achieves almost same performance provided by perfect cryptography strategy that can remove all the modified messages from relay.
Thesis organization
This thesis is organized as follows, chapter 2 describes the system model been investigated, where source transmit messages to destination target. But due to channel poor quality between them, source also broadcast the signal to a near relay node and Let node help relaying the message to destination target. However since the relay is untrustworthy, it may forward modified messages to the destination to undermine the information integrity. And we analyze the error probability of system model based on the different detection results. In chapter 3, we proposed an optimal detection method to detect the modified messages in the physical layer by exploiting the hamming distance [10] property between channel codewords. This is followed with the theoretical analysis for applying optimal detecting threshold. Since the calculation of optimal detecting threshold requires the pre-knowledge of the attack probability, a cryptography-aided estimation strategy of attack probability is developed. The numerical results and conclusions are in chapter 4 and chapter 5 respectively.
THE COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION

Problem statement
In cooperative relaying communication, the source transmitter broadcasts the message to the destination target. Sometimes the destination target is far away from the source transmitter or there are obstacles standing between them, these all will cause the channel gain decreasing significantly [11] . If the destination only decodes the message based on the signal overheard from the source, the probability of decoding error would is high. In order to avoid this situation, the source would choose a relay node [12] and also broadcasts the signals to it.
Since the channel gain between relay and destination is efficiently high, relay will re-transmit the signals to the destination and destination can combine both identical signals together to decode the message. However, the source cannot guarantee all the relays in networks are trustworthy, so there is a high chance that relay node will modify the original message from source and sends another different message to the destination. If destination decodes the message based on modified signals, the probability of decoding error is much higher than just decoding signal from the source even if source-to-destination channel quality is poor. Thus destination has to check the message integrity by applying some detection techniques. Ideally this goal can be achieved if we encrypt all the messages by advanced cryptography, but compared with physical layer detection method, the computational cost of cryptography is much higher, so it is valuable to develop an approach in physical layer.
System model
The system model being investigated is shown in Fig. 1 . We consider the situation that source wishes to send message to the destination, but the channel quality between is poor due to the long distance between. So source transmitter also broadcasts signals to an untrustworthy relay and relay forward it to the destination. The is the Source broadcaster, represents intermediate Relay and is Destination receiver. For simplicity, the system uses BPSK modulation mode.
Here is designed based on the channel BCH (n, k) code [13] , one of CEC (Cyclic Error-Correcting) channel code [14] , let denotes the CEC channel code's self-correct ability, it is to say if the erroneous bits in codeword is less than bits, if could be automatically corrected.
In the first phase, encodes the k-bits length original message into an n-bits length codeword , then broadcast to relay and destination simultaneously. In phase 2, relay retransmit to , and we assume relay always receives from source correctly because of the short distance between them. Last phase destination generates the decoded codeword � based on the signals received from relay and destination. And the decoded message � can be obtained by passing � through the BCH decoder.
Figure 1. The cooperative relaying model
As the we discussed in the chapter 2.1, the untrustworthy relay holds malicious intension, it may modifies into another codeword with probability . Let = ℎ + be the signal received from source and = ℎ + be the signal received from the relay. Where ℎ~(0, 2 ) and ℎ~(0, 2 ) represent the channel fading coefficients respectively. Because the channel quality of relay-to-destination is better compared with the channel quality of source-to-destination, usually channel gain 1 2 < 2 2 , and are the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with the variance 0 , the transmit SNR is / 0 .
We already know if system decodes message based on modified codeword and original codeword , the probability of decoding error is efficiently high. In next section we describe the physical layer method that detects the integrity of , and is discarded if detection determines it contains the modified , Otherwise and are combined together by applying the MRC [15] (Maximal-ratio combining) rule to improve the received SNR (signal noise ratio).
The detection method
Since source encodes the message by using BCH (n, k) code, let + and + + denote two k-bits length vector corresponding to the source's and relay's respectively. Where " + " represents XOR operation and is the modification vector generated by relay. and are just "random error vector" represent Gaussian noise and respectively.
In general, + must be a valid codeword in the designed BCH (n, k) codebook, or it will be abandoned as corrupt codeword due to the invalidity of channel code. Furthermore the relay should chooses the most similar codeword to original one. Since the noise exists, the more similarity between + and , the lower chance + will be detected as a modified codeword.
So based on discussion above, define ( ) be the hamming weight (the total bit 1s in binary vector) calculation function of . The relay's "behavior" can described as below:
Relay may modifies the original codeword into another valid codeword + with the probability . And ( ) = , ≠ 0, where is the minimal hamming distance between two codewords. Let:
0 denotes the event that relay not modify , so = 0.
1 denotes the event that relay does modify , so ≠ 0.
So we construct a hypothesis test [16] that compares the hamming distance between codeword + sent by source and + + sent by relay, if the hamming distance is no less than some threshold , we decide there is an attack and reject event 0 , otherwise accept
if we assume = + , then (1) equivalents to
Under � 0 , destination combines and using MRC rule to increase the received SNR; under � 1 , the relay's is discarded and the message is decoded based on only.
Next section, we derive the decoding error based on the different detection results, for convince, the notation symbols used in the derivation is listed in appendix A.
The probability of decoding error
In chapter 2.3, we know detection determine whether to combine with or not. If detection result is � 1 , the message only is decoded based on ; otherwise destination combines and using MRC rule to decode the message. Thus the average probability of decoding error can be expressed as:
the three terms in (3) 
denote the bit error probability in the source-to-destination channel and the relay-todestination channel respectively, where
are the average received SNR respectively. Then the probability of a bit in vector = + e e e e e e e e e = − + − + − = (6) Next section we derive the decoding error of modification decision, the decoding error of correct detection and the decoding error of miss detection respectively.
Decoding error of modification decision
Given � 1 , is discarded and the message is decoded based the only. Since the bit error probability (before decoding) of the source-to-destination channel is and error correction ability is , the probability of decoding error is given by
the probability of deciding � 1 is given by ( ) ( ) ( )
where (probability of false alarm)
and (probability of modification detection)
Let denote the number of the 1's in that are changed by , so its probability mass function is given by
In order to get ( + ) ≥ , we need at least ( − − ) 1's in the other positions (not the position where in is 1) of . However there are two special condition:
The value of equation (11) equals to 1.
If − ( − ) > − , then ( + ) < can't be achieved. The value of equation (11) equals to 0.
so we obtain:
Combine equation (7) and (10), the (9) equals to ( )
Therefore it follows from (7) (8) (9)and (12) ( ) 
Decoding error of correct detection
Given ( � 0 , 0 ) which is the ideal situation for communication system and the message is decoded based on the MRC combining of and (unmodified). The bit error probability of MRC combining of and is given by (26) in the Appendix A.
Therefore the probability of decoding error is ( )
We obtain ( ) 
Decoding error of miss detection
The ( � 0 , 1 ) (miss detection) is the worst case, the bit error probability ′ of MRC combining of and is given by (29) in the Appendix B Therefore the probability of decoding error is 
The Pr( � ≠ ) (average probability of decoding error) can be obtained by applying (14) (17) and (20) into equation (3) . Since , , and ′ are the constant parameters which can be calculated based the transmit SNR, and are designed by the BCH code, the Pr( � ≠ )
is a function of the attack probability and detection threshold . Next chapter we will describe the proposed optimal detection method that minimize the average probability of the decoding error.
THE COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION
Optimal detection threshold
Since the goal of optimal detection is to minimize the Pr( � ≠ ) (average probability of decoding error). And from the analysis in the chapter 2, we know Pr( � ≠ ) is a function of and , Then it is equivalent to find the optimal threshold ( ) which satisfies:
So given a specific value of attack probability , the ( ) can be obtained by exhaust search: changing from 0 to and find the one that minimize the average probability of decoding error. 
Figure 2. Optimal threshold versus attack probability
It can be seen that the optimal threshold keep unchanged in certain range around attack probability. And higher attack probability produces a lower optimal detecting threshold value.
Furthermore it can be observed that the optimal threshold becomes very robust against attack probability when transmit SNR achieve high level.
In conclusion, because is a secret only known to relay and ( ) depends on , it is necessary to estimate in finding optimal detecting threshold scheme, especially in the low transmit SNR case.
Crypto-aided estimation of attack probability
Since estimating the attack probability can help calculate the optimal detecting threshold, so we proposed a scheme that utilizes a few cryptographic [18] encrypted codewords in initial codewords, which it used as the training reference to help estimating attack probability. Then use ( � ) to substitute ( ) as the optimal threshold value for optimal detecting method.
Figure 3. The codewords forwarded by source transmitter
As shown in Fig. 3 , suppose source transmitter encrypt total number of codewords by cryptography [19] , and distributes these codewords randomly into initial number of codewords. We assume only source transmitter and destination know where those encrypted codewords locate. Thus destination can directly know if these codewords are modified or not once it receives first codewords.
Take the timeliness issue into consideration, usually be a small number (for example < 20). Furthermore, set ≪ (for example = 2~6) to reduce computation cost caused by cryptographic encryption.
The first step depicted in Fig. 4 , destination check those codewords and record the cryptographic outcomes in . Where is a length-indicator vector whose element is 1 if the corresponding codeword is modified, otherwise it is 0. 
Figure 5. Physical layer detection for encrypted codewords
The third step, we calculate the hamming distance between vector and 
In case there are multiple ̂ satisfy equation (22), depending on the situation, if the miss detection loss is more severe than false alarm does, system can choose the smallest to minimize the miss detection rate [19] . Otherwise choose the biggest ̂ to minimize the false alarm rate.
Final step is drawn in Fig .6 , apply physical layer detection to those − unencrypted codewords with =̂ in equation (2) and record the detection results in .
Where is a length-− indicator vector whose element is 1 if the detected codeword is determined been modified, otherwise it is 0.
Figure 6. Physical layer detection for unencrypted codewords
Then calculate � by
Thus
( � ) can be obtained by equation (19) .
Crypto-aided physical layer integrity check process
In chapter 3.1 we discuss optimal detecting threshold and in chapter 3.2 we develop a scheme to estimate the attack probability which is necessary to calculate the optimal detection threshold. In this section we describe our crypto-aided physical layer integrity check process as shown in Fig. 7 .
After receive the signals from source transmitter and relay, destination first subtract initial codewords and utilizes the encrypted codewords information to estimate the attack probability . Then the estimation � can be used as pre-knowledge to produce the optimal detection threshold ( � ). Next step, destination applies ( � ) to the physical layer detection processor to detect the all the other unencrypted codewords. If the detection shows codewords is modified, it will be discarded; otherwise destination will combine both codeword by using MRC rule to decode the message.
Figure 7. Crypto-aided physical layer integrity check process
NUMERITICAL RESULTS
This chapter will first analyze the proposed optimal detection scheme performance based on the different detection threshold value and compare them for several different attack probability cases. Then investigating the estimation of attack probability performance provided by the proposed algorithm. Finally we will show the simulation results of the cooperative relaying system by applying our crypto-aided physical layer integrity check technique.
Probability of decoding error versus detecting threshold
We will first analyze the proposed optimal detection scheme performance. Analytical results for probability of decoding error versus detecting threshold is shown in Fig.8 . Let = 0.3 , 2 = 0.5 , 2 = 1 , and use BCH (15, 7) code. Compare the situations where transmit = 10 , 15 , 20 . It can be observed that when the detecting threshold approaches to the optimal value, the error probability decreases significantly. In the view of SNR aspect, when SNR increases, the optimal threshold value and the decoded error rate both decrease.
And in Fig. 9 , we compare the probability of decoding error versus detecting threshold given different relay's attack probability scenarios, where = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7. Let 2 = 0.5,
. BCH (15, 7) code and use BCH (15, 7) code. It can be seen that as relay's attack probability decreases, the probability of decoding error and optimal detecting threshold both decrease due to less modification codewords received. 
Attack probability estimation versus transmit SNR
This section we investigate the performance of our estimated attack probability. 
Optimal detecting threshold and proposed optimal threshold estimation
The optimal detecting threshold has been analyzed in chapter 3.1 and the proposed optimal is described in chapter 3.2. The Fig. 11 shows simulation comparison results between optimal detecting threshold and proposed optimal detecting threshold estimation versus relay's attack probability. BCH (15, 7) code, Let 2 = 0.5 , 2 = 1 , = 20 , = 3 , transmit = 10 and use BCH (15, 7) code. Since ( ) keep robust in a small range around as shown in Fig. 2 , it can be seen the corresponding ( �) produced by proposed scheme is very close to ( ). The only divergence exists in the special situation, where = 0.
Because when there is no modified codewords, destination should always accept the signal from the relay, thus the analytical optimal threshold achieves a large value. Since we choose the scheme that minimizes the miss detection rate in simulations, it tends overestimates the and produces a smaller value of ( � ) . Furthermore it can be observed that the optimal detecting threshold is robust against relay's attack probability especially in high SNR. For another special situation where = 1, both analytical and proposed scheme estimation of optimal threshold converge to 0 that system always discard codewords from relay. 
False alarm rate and miss detection rate
We investigate the how false alarm rate and miss detection rate varies against threshold closed by destination in the section. Fig. 12 and use BCH (15, 7) code. Overall, both false alarm rate and miss detection rate decrease with SNR increases. But there exists several "change" points in both curves, it is because the optimal threshold changes a smaller value when SNR achieves the efficient high level (as shown in Fig.8 ). And a smaller optimal threshold produces a higher false alarm rate and a lower miss detection rate.
Crypto-aided physical layer integrity check
This section we show the simulation results of cooperative relaying system performance by applying our crypto-aided physical layer integrity check technique. destination may discard the signals from the relay and only decodes based on the signal from the source, otherwise both signals are combined together by using the maximum ration combining rule to decode the message. In analysis we show that by applying the optimal detection threshold method, the average probability of decoding error can be minimized.
However the optimal detection threshold calculation requires the pre-knowledge of the relay's attack probability.
Since the optimal threshold value is robust against the relay's attack probability in a certain range around and with transmit SNR increases it tend to keep unchanged. Thus we proposed a scheme to estimate the attack probability that utilizes this property. And our results
show that the performance provided by optimal threshold based on the proposed cryptographyaided scheme estimation achieves a good performance as the perfect cryptography strategy.
Even though perfect cryptography strategy can detect all the modified messages, it consumes a significant high computational resource to apply cryptographic encryption to all the transmitted messages.
Furthermore since the optimal threshold value is very robust against the relay's attack in high SNR, the can be used for a long duration to achieve the high efficiency in practice. It is unnecessary to refresh estimated optimal threshold value frequently; furthermore the total amount cryptography computation cost in the proposed scheme can be very small so that it can be easily applied to the resource-constrained distributed wireless network system.
APPENDIX A NOTATION
Symbol Meaning
Original message The relay's attack probability
